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MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
swung too far, the banks being allowed to contract away
so great a portion of their liability. Should cases arise in
which the statute works a hardship on the lessees, it is
likely that there will be a demand for its revision. How-
ever, at present, it would seem that a bank, or other de-
pository, would avail itself of the liberal provisions of the
statute by inserting appropriate wording in its contracts.
EXTENT OF IMPLIED WARRANTY OF FITNESS
Poplar v. Hochschild, Kohn & Co., Inc.'
Plaintiff bought a box of face powder and other toilet
articles from defendant department store. The set was
contained in an ornate box, decorated with two metal stars.
In opening the box, plaintiff cut her finger on one of these
stars. She brought an action against the department store,
alleging that it was liable for breach of implied warranty
of fitness. The declaration stated that plaintiff bought
the powder for toilet and beautifying purposes. The Court
of Appeals affirmed the lower court which had sustained
defendant's demurrer, stating as reasons for doing so: (1)
that an implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose
does not cover defects in the container in which the goods
are packed, and (2) that there is no implied warranty of
fitness as to patent defects where plaintiff has examined
the goods.
One of the changes wrought by the Uniform Sales Act
in respect to warranty of fitness for a particular purpose
was to extend the liability of the manufacturer or grower
for breach thereof to all sellers, be they growers or manu-
facturers or not.' A Maryland case which clearly and con-
cisely points out this change is that of Luria Bros. & Co. v.
Klaif.3 There the plaintiff, who was the seller but not the
manufacturer, brought an action to recover the price of
several carloads of metal. Defendant buyer claimed that
he was entitled to a set-off arising out of a prior sale of steel
1 24 A. (2d) 783 (Md., 1942).
2 Sec. 15 (1), found in Md. Code (1939) Art. 83, See. 33: "Subject to
the provisions of this sub-title and of any statute in that behalf, there is
no implied warranty or condition as to the quality or fitness for any
particular purpose of goods supplied under a contract to sell or a sale,
except as follows: (1) Where the buyer, expressly or by implication,
makes known to the seller the particular purpose for which the goods are
required, and it appears that the buyer relies on the seller's skill or judg-
ment (whether he be the grower or manufacturer or not), there is an
implied warranty that the goods shall be reasonably fit for such purpose."
S139 Md. 586, 115 A. 849 (1921).
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shells. He alleged that plaintiff knew that defendant was
buying the shells for remelting purposes, that the defend-
ant relied on the plaintiff's skill and judgment, and that
the shells were not fit for the purposes for which they had
been purchased. The trial court held that there was no
implied warranty of fitness since the seller was not the
manufacturer. This was reversed by the Court of Appeals,
the latter court pointing out that the trial court had er-
roneously applied the common law rule rather than that
set forth in the Uniform Sales Act.4
The rule is thus well settled that the seller impliedly
warrants the fitness of the goods he sells where two ele-
ments are present, namely, (1) knowledge of the seller of
the purpose for which the goods are being purchased, and
(2) reliance of the buyer on the seller's skill and judgment.
The necessity of the first of these two conditions precedent
was pointed out in King v. Gaver.5 In that case plaintiff
had bought three heifer calves at a public sale. Subse-
quently he brought an action against the vendor for breach
of an implied warranty of fitness, alleging that he had
purchased the calves for breeding and dairy purposes and
that they were unfit therefor because of their diseased
condition at the time of the sale. The Court found for the
defendant, one of the reasons for its decision being that
there was no implied warranty that the heifers were
adapted to breeding and dairying purposes as the buyer
had not informed the seller of his anticipated use of the
animals. The Court recognized, however, that the buyer
is not required expressly to state his purpose, that this
can be done by implication. And it is generally recognized
'The language of the Court was as follows: ". . . the view taken by
the court in regard to implied warranty was in accordance with the settled
law of this state prior to the Uniform Sales Act . . . In Commercial
Realty and Construction Co. v. Dorsey, 114 Md. 178 . . . the law of implied
warranty was stated to be as follows: 'Where a manufacturer contracts
to supply an article which he manufactures to be applied to a particular
purpose so that the buyer necessarily trusts to the judgment or skill of
the manufacturer, there is in that case an implied term or warranty that
it shall be reasonably fit for the purpose to which it is to be applied. In
such a case the buyer trusts to the manufacturer or dealer and relies upon
his judgment and not his own . . . We have held with equal clearness
that when the seller is not the manufacturer of the thing sold and the
buyer has an opportunity of examining it there is no implied warranty,
in the absence of fraud, that it shall be fit for the purpose for which
it was bought . . . But the important change made by this section [15(1)
of the Uniform Sales Act] was to put the seller, who is not the grower or
manufacturer of the thing sold, in the position which was formerly held
in this State by the manufacturer or grower only, in reference to the
implied warranty mentioned."
5 175 Md. 76, 3 A. (2d) 863 (1939).
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that where a buyer purchases an article commonly used
for a particular purpose, he impliedly represents that he
intends to use it in the usual manner.' For example, where
he buys food at retail, he impliedly represents that his
purpose is human consumption.
So in the case under consideration, the buyer by pur-
chasing face powder at retail implied that the face powder
was to be used for toilet and beautifying purposes, and the
seller was aware of that purpose. As to the second condi-
tion precedent, that the buyer rely on the seller's skill
and judgment, unless the former selects the particular item
he wants, this may also be implied from the fact that the
seller is in a position of superior knowledge of the subject-
matter of the contract. Frequently involved in many of
the cases dealing with this point is the "trade name" provi-
sion of the Sales Act which provides that in the case of a
sale of a specified article under its trade name there is no
implied warranty of fitness. 7 It could be assumed that the
present plaintiff bought the goods under a trade name, for
all face powders handled by a modern department store
are so sold. A strict and literal construction of this provi-
sion, without regard to the policy of the Act as a whole,
might lead to the conclusion that the plaintiff could not
recover on the theory of breach of implied warranty of
fitness. The courts have, however, increasingly concerned
themselves with determining who made the selection of
the goods and tend to hold that, where the seller does the
selecting, the fact that the article bears a trade name is im-
material. A case to that effect is Parker v. Morgan," where
it was held that the manufacturer impliedly represented
that the heating system sold by him would meet the
standard test in the locality, notwithstanding the fact that
the system had been sold under a trade name. So it is
well settled that in this case an implied warranty of fitness
could exist.
The Court could have dismissed plaintiff's action on the
ground which it briefly mentioned as a second reason for
its decision, that is, admitting that the container was in
fact defective, still there is no liability on the part of the
seller because the defect was a patent one. Section 15 (3)
of the Uniform Sales Act provides that: "If the buyer has
WrLLISTON, SATx S (1924) 485; VOLD, SALES (1931) 485.
7Md. Code (1939) Art. 83, Sec. 31(4): "In the case of a contract to
sell or a sale of a specified article under its patent or other trade name,
there is no implied warranty as to its fitness for any particular purpose."8 170 Md. 7, 183 A. 224 (1935).
[VOL. VII
POPLAR v. HOCHSCHILD, KOHN
examined the goods, there is no implied warranty in regard
to defects which such examination ought to have shown."
Although there is considerable confusion on the effect of
inspection by the buyer in various fact situations,9 yet
it is clear that where the buyer has in fact inspected the
goods and the defect is not latent, the seller does not im-
pliedly warrant the fitness of the goods. A recent case so
holding is that of King v. Gaver,10 where the Court held
that because the buyer had examined the heifers at the
time of the sale and saw tags on them which might have
indicated the presence of Bang's disease, Section 15(3)
applied and that, therefore, the seller did not impliedly
warrant the fitness of the calves. The effect of the exam-
ination in cases where the defect is patent is to negative
the presumption that the buyer relied on the seller's skill
and judgment.
The major portion of the Court's opinion dealt with a
phase of the law of implied warranties never before con-
sidered by the Maryland court, namely, whether an im-
plied warranty of fitness covers defects in the container of
the goods sold. The Court held that it did not. In so
deciding, reliance was placed on the Illinois case of Cran-
dall v. Stop and Shop, Inc." In that case the plaintiff was
the purchaser of a jar of fruit preserves. In opening the
jar, plaintiff was injured as a result of the spring clamp
suddenly flying up and striking her in the face. The Court
found that by the exercise of due care plaintiff could have
avoided the accident and that the jar was not in fact de-
fective. Then, expressing concurrence with a case decided
in the Superior Court of Los Angeles,' 2 the Illinois Court
went on to say that:
"... it was not contemplated that a warranty of
fitness for a particular purpose was thereby attached
to many forms of container in which goods sold for
human consumption are confined or packed, but only
to the contents thereof-the food or beverage or sub-
stance which the purchaser was seeking or buying;
'that the container is but an incident to the goods thus
offered for sale, and while it is just and reasonable to
burden the seller with an implied warranty of fitness
'See Note, Sales-Warranties-Effect of Buyer's Inspection Upon an
Express or Implied Warranty in the Sale of Goods (1939) 23 Minn. L.
Rev. 941.
10 176 Md. 76, 3 A. (2d) 863 (1939).
11 288 Ill. App. 543, 6 N. E. (2d) 685 (1937).
12 Reported in the Chicago Daily Law Bulletin of April 20, 1936.
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or of merchantable quality of the contents of a con-
tainer or bottle, or of a sealed package, it would be
unreasonably burdensome to attach such warranty to
the container of foodstuffs sold, and thus, in effect,
make the retail seller of every bottle of pop or carbon-
ated beverage, in the manufacture of which he has no
part, an insurer against damage from explosion of such
bottle'."
It is submitted that a more realistic approach is that
taken by the English court in the case of Geddling v.
March.13 There the plaintiff bought some bottles of min-
eral water from the defendant. One of the bottles burst
and plaintiff was severely injured. The Court found that
the accident arose from a latent defect in the bottle. In
holding the defendant liable for a breach of implied war-
ranty of fitness, the Court pointed out that the mineral
water had to be delivered in some sort of container and
so both the mineral water and the bottles were sold under
a contract of sale, to which the warranty applies. This is
a sound result. The purpose of the warranty provisions of
the Sales Act is primarily to afford a reasonable measure
of protection to the buying public. Such a purpose would
be defeated if courts take the narrow view that by buying
goods which have to be supplied in containers of some sort,
if the goods themselves cause injury, the buyer is protected
while if the container causes injury, the buyer is not pro-
tected. The two-the product and its necessary container
-go hand in hand; injury resulting from a defect in the
latter should have the same consequence as to the seller's
liability for defects as the former. If a court will go so
far as to hold that the seller is an insurer of the contents
of the container, which the Illinois Court found to be rea-
sonable, why should it be unreasonable for him to be an
insurer of the container itself? His measure of control
over each is the same. It is submitted that while the result
in the principal case is sound on the particular facts yet in
a case having a similar factual set-up but with the defect
in the container being latent rather than patent, the Court
should consider the factual question of whether the defect
was one which the buyer could have discovered by reason-
able inspection. If this question is answered in the nega-
tive, then the seller should be held liable to the buyer
under the warranty of -fitness provision of the sales act.
Is [1920] 1 K. B. 668.
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